Today’s encryption has a deadline.
Regulators have set 2030 to 2035 for moving off the public-key encryption most systems rely on. Every programme starts the same way: finding out what cryptography you actually run. QSafe does that, plans the migration, and keeps it current.
One hour, no charge: where your cryptography is likely to be, and which deadlines apply to you.
Record it now. Read it later.
Most of the internet’s security relies on public-key methods, RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography, that a large enough quantum computer could break.
Nobody can say when such a machine will exist. But an attacker does not have to wait for one: encrypted traffic can be recorded today and decrypted when the means arrive. Anything that must stay secret for years, such as health records, financial data, contracts or credentials, is therefore exposed in principle already.
That is why the deadlines exist, and why they are early. They are policy choices that leave time to migrate. The work is driven by the calendar and by compliance, not by an attack, and it starts with an inventory.
The dates regulators have set.
Checked October 2026. We check each one again before every engagement, because they move.
We found no South African mandate specific to post-quantum cryptography. The pressure here comes from international partners, parent companies abroad and global vendors.
-
August 2024
NIST publishes the first standards
FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA): the post-quantum algorithms to migrate to. Source: NIST.
-
End of 2026
European Union: national plans
Member States are expected to have started their national transition plans and inventories. High-risk systems follow by 2030, everything feasible by 2035. Source: European Commission.
-
1 January 2027
NSA CNSA 2.0: new acquisitions
New US national security system acquisitions must support quantum-resistant algorithms. Full transition by 2035. Source: NSA.
-
2028
UK NCSC: discovery and plan
Identify the cryptography that needs upgrading and have a migration plan. High-priority migration by 2031, complete by 2035. Source: NCSC.
-
2029
Google and Cloudflare: their own migrations complete
Both have set 2029 as the year their services are fully post-quantum, authentication included. Source: Cloudflare.
-
After 2030
NIST: RSA-2048 and 256-bit ECC deprecated
Under NIST IR 8547, quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms are deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035. Source: NIST.
-
2030 to 2035
G7 Cyber Expert Group: financial sector
A non-binding roadmap for banks and financial infrastructure (January 2026): inventory and plans first, critical systems around 2030 to 2032, the transition complete by 2035. Source: G7 Cyber Expert Group statement, 12 January 2026.
-
After 2035
The cut-off
Quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography disallowed under NIST guidance, and the common end date across the EU, UK, G7 and US plans.
Five stages, and then again.
Systems change and standards move, so the five stages repeat. The inventory at the centre is the record everything else is built on.
Discover
Scan code, dependencies, certificates, TLS endpoints and key stores for cryptography.
Inventory
Build the cryptographic bill of materials (CBOM): every algorithm, key, certificate and library, and who owns it.
Assess
Rank systems by how long their data must stay secret, how exposed they are, and how weak the algorithm is.
Migrate
Plan the waves, rehearse hybrid key exchange and signing, write the runbooks and the rollback.
Monitor
Catch new weak cryptography as it appears, track standards changes, and report to the board.
The CBOM is yours, in an open format. It is held in CycloneDX, standardised as ECMA-424, so you can take it to any other tool if you leave.
Start small, then keep it current.
Scan and Readiness are available now. The monitoring platform is in development, built from what the assessments teach.
QSafe Scan
An automated scan of one application or environment, with a CBOM and a findings report.
QSafe Readiness
A full inventory of a business unit or institution, risk ranking against the deadlines, a migration roadmap and a board pack.
QSafe Migrate
Engineering support for each migration wave: hybrid key exchange, certificate and signing changes, runbooks and rollback.
QSafe Monitor
Continuous discovery, drift alerts, standards updates and a quarterly board report.
QSafe Embedded
Secure boot, signed updates and device identity for fleets of connected devices and robots, designed so the cryptography can be swapped later.
Programme
For large organisations, a programme across business units, delivered with partners where the scale calls for it.
Prices depend on the size of the estate and are quoted after the free workshop.
Not a report that dates. A live record.
- A live inventory of algorithms, certificates, protocols and libraries across applications, networks, key stores and vendor products.
- A risk ranking that combines how long the data must stay secret, how exposed the system is and how weak its algorithm is.
- A deadline view comparing your estate with the timelines above.
- A migration board: waves, owners, test results and rollback plans.
- Board and regulator reports on a schedule.
- An interface for your other tools, so the inventory can feed ticketing, governance and risk systems.
Three things we never do.
Write our own cryptography
We use reviewed implementations of the NIST algorithms from mainstream libraries. Inventing cryptography is how systems fail.
Collect keys, secrets or personal data
Scanners run inside your environment and collect metadata only.
Lock you in
The inventory is in an open format, and it is yours.
For data that must stay secret.
- Fintechs and payment providers
- Insurers
- Mutual banks and lenders
- Telecoms
- Infrastructure operators
- Makers of connected devices
Large banks are served through partners who already hold the relationship.
What security teams ask first.
Nobody knows when a machine large enough will exist. That is the point of the deadlines: they are policy choices that leave enough time to migrate before anyone has to find out. Data that must stay secret for years is exposed in principle already, because it can be recorded now and decrypted later.
We have not found a South African regulator mandate specific to post-quantum cryptography. The pressure here comes from international partners, group parents abroad and global vendors that are moving anyway. We check each regulator’s position again before every engagement.
No, never. We use reviewed implementations of the NIST algorithms from mainstream libraries. Our work is finding what you have, deciding what to change first, and changing it safely.
No. Scanners run inside your environment and collect metadata only: which algorithm, which key length, which certificate, where. Never keys, secrets or personal data.
Yes. Your cryptographic inventory is kept in CycloneDX, an open format standardised as ECMA-424, so any tool can read it.
It depends on the size of the estate. QSafe Scan covers one application or environment; Readiness covers a business unit or an institution. Ask, and we will scope it in the free workshop.
One hour to know where you stand.
The exposure workshop is free. You leave knowing where your cryptography is likely to be, which deadlines apply, and what a first scan would cover.